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Abstract: This paper investigates empirically how the reaction of monetary policy to 
exchange rate has changed after the adoption of inflation targeting regime in three 
East Asian countries. Using a structural VAR and single equation methods, this study 
shows that the reactions of monetary policy to exchange rate shocks as well as CPI 
(demand shocks) and output (supply shocks) have declined under the inflation 
targeting environment. The policy function reacts weakly to the exchange rate 
movements before and after the financial crisis of 1997 in two out of the three 
countries.    
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1 Introduction 
 
Although the role of exchange rate in the setup of monetary policy in emerging 
market is no longer new in the international macroeconomics literatures, it still 
remains as a hot topic for debates among researchers. The research on the design of 
monetary policy rule before was based on the case of closed economy. For example, 
in the simple Taylor rule, interest rate as the policy instrument is a weighted function 
of inflation and output gap. This rule does not give a direct role to the exchange rate. 
The closed economy assumes that there is only one price in the market, no influence 
or shock from the other economies, therefore the closed economy achieves stability 
condition and welfare maximization and there is no direct role for the exchange rate in 
the policy reaction function.  
 
However, in the real world, economies are quite open and the exchange rate 
movements can be matter in the design of monetary policy. Many studies suggest the 
inclusion of exchange rate term in the policy reaction function and show that 
exchange rate plays an improving role to the performances of monetary policy rules 
and enhances higher welfare of agents (for examples Ball (1999), Batini et.al (2001) 
and Senay (2001)). Exchange rate contributes to the demand channel through the 
effects of relative price (foreign and domestic goods) and creates the direct exchange 
rate channel through the convert of domestic currency prices of foreign produced 
goods. It affects the aggregate demand for domestic goods (Senay, 2001).  
 
Contrary to the above arguments on the role of exchange rate in the open economy 
framework, Taylor (2001) argues that adding exchange rate into the policy reaction 
function may induce loss of credibility in targeting inflation. The reasons are:  first, 
exchange rate affects inflation and output in the policy reaction function indirectly; 
second, giving a direct role to exchange rate in the Taylor rule may add volatility to 
the monetary policy (Taylor 2001). Due to the above reasons, it is suggested that the 
central bank should pay attention at the effects of exchange rate fluctuations on 
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inflation and output gap but on the other hand should not give an independent role for 
the exchange rate in the policy reaction function (Mishkin (2000) and Schmidt-
Hebbel (2002)). 
 
This study extends the studies on the role of exchange rate in the monetary policy 
reaction under the inflation targeting environment in three inflation targeting East 
Asian countries. It seeks to investigate the relationship of monetary policy and 
exchange rate from two perspectives: the impulse response of monetary policy to 
exchange rate shocks and the responses of monetary policy to exchange rate 
movements. Two approaches are applied in this study, i.e the structural VAR and the 
single equation of GMM. First, using the structural VAR approach, this study seeks to 
investigate how the monetary policy responds to the exchange rate disturbances/ 
shocks before and after the adoption of inflation targeting regime. How large the 
effect of exchange rate shocks is accounted for in the forecast error variances 
decomposition for monetary policy as compare to the other shocks? Second, using the 
single equation of GMM, this study seeks to estimate the coefficients of the policy 
reaction function with respect to the policy targets such as output gap and inflation as 
compare to that of exchange rate between the two sub-periods.  Through this 
estimation, one can observe how does the policy react to the exchange rate shocks and 
movements and how does the reaction change between the two sub-periods.  
 
The main findings of this study are the responses of monetary policy to shocks 
including the exchange rate shocks have declined in the post-crisis period. At the 
same time, the price or inflation shocks can explain higher forecast errors of monetary 
policy relative to other shocks. The policy makers in these countries react differently 
to exchange rate movements and inflation variable. With the exception of Thailand, 
the policy reaction functions in Korea and Philippines do not react significantly to the 
exchange rate movements in the two sub-periods. Although these countries have 
implemented the inflation targeting after the financial crisis, only Thailand shows a 
significant reaction of monetary policy to the inflation variable. The policy maker in 
Philippines pays higher concerns on output gap stability after the crisis.   
 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section two reviews the literature on 
the relationship between monetary policy and the exchange rate. Section three is 
about the data. Section four discusses the methodologies. Section five discusses the 
results. Section six concludes. 
 
 
2 The issue of exchange rate in emerging countries – some reviews 
  
There are numerous empirical studies that investigate the relationship between 
monetary policy and exchange rate. In general, the main literatures that address the 
relationship between the exchange rate and the monetary policy can be divided into 
three categories. The first category examines the exchange rate pass-through in the 
inflation targeting emerging markets. The second category investigates and compares 
the results of the volatility of exchange rate in inflation targeting and non inflation 
targeting countries. The third category examines the responses of the monetary policy 
to the exchange rate movements. 
 
The research in the exchange rate pass-through shows that exchange rate and 
monetary policy are correlated to each other. Many studies show that exchange rate 
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pass-through in emerging countries is higher than that in the developed countries. 
Therefore, it is argued that emerging countries face higher difficulties in their efforts 
to target at low inflation rate and maintain price stability (Minella et.al, 2003, Fraga, 
2003 and Nogueira Junior, 2007). However, a number of studies show that the pass-
through rate has declined in many countries and researchers have different 
explanations for that. One of the famous explanations is that the low pass-through rate 
correlates with low inflation rate as a consequence of strong commitment towards 
price stability by Taylor (2000). The view of Taylor is supported by many empirical 
studies such as Edwards (2006), Gagnon and Ihrig (2004) and Nogueira Junior 
(2007). 
 
The inter-relationship between exchange rate and monetary policy can also be 
captured through the exchange rate volatility. Emerging countries tend to pay greater 
concerns on achieving the exchange rate stability than that of advanced countries do 
as they have lower credibility to control the low inflation rate. According to Mishkin 
& Savastano (2001), the inflation targeters should float the exchange rate for better 
functioning of the inflation targeting regime. This requirement can be explained by 
the theory of ‘Impossibility of the Holy Trinity’ where the capital mobility and the 
monetary policy independence cannot be achieved under the pegged or fixed 
exchange rate regime. Controlling the exchange rate movements may generate two 
risks, i.e the risk of transforming the exchange rate into a nominal anchor that takes 
over the inflation target and the risk where the movements of exchange rate may 
depend on the nature of shocks (Mishkin, 2004). Therefore arguably, the inflation 
targeting countries may experience higher exchange rate volatility. However, some 
empirical studies show that this condition may not hold (for example, Edwards 
(2006)).  
 
The role of exchange rate in the design of monetary policy rules is another way to 
study the relationship of exchange rate and monetary policy. The results from the 
empirical studies are quite controversial. By estimating the Taylor rule type policy 
rules, Mohanty & Klau (2004) show that in most of the emerging countries, the 
monetary policy responds to exchange rate strongly. Frömmel & Schobert (2006) 
estimate the simple Taylor type policy rules for six Central and Eastern European 
countries. They find that exchange rate plays an important role in the monetary policy 
during the fixed exchange rate regimes periods. However, the influence disappears 
after these countries have moved to the flexible regimes. On the other hand, Osawa 
(2006) in his study on three Asian inflation targeting countries finds no evidence of 
monetary policy response to the exchange rate. He argues that the reason for this 
difference result is because the existing studies do not consider structural breaks of 
data in their estimations. Besides, including the crisis period in the sample of 
estimation may overestimate the response of monetary policy to exchange rate.  
 
 
2.1 Exchange rate regimes and monetary policy in Asian 
 
The financial crisis of 1997 and 1998 in East Asian countries totally changed the 
monetary policies and exchange rate regimes in these countries. According to the 
International Monetary Financial (IMF) classifications, Korea has moved from 
managed floating to independently floating regime after the crisis. Thailand on the 
other hand, has moved from pegged exchange rate to managed floating regime while 
Philippines remains the same regime as independently floating after the crisis (see 
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TableI(1)). The move from rigidity to more flexible regimes give some effects on the 
volatility of the exchange rate, foreign exchange reserves and the interest rate (see 
table below). In general, the change in the regimes leads to higher fluctuations in 
exchange rate in three Asian countries in this study. However, the foreign exchange 
reserves and interest rate have declined in all three countries after the crisis. 
 
Table (i): 
Volatility of Exchange Rate, Foreign Exchange Reserves and Interest Rate 
 Korea Philippines Thailand 
 Pre-
crisis 
Post-
crisis 
Pre-
crisis 
Post-
crisis 
Pre-
crisis 
Post-
crisis 
Exchange rate 0.70 2.18 2.21 2.28 0.46 1.95 
Foreign exchange reserves 3.59 1.88 12.42 3.43 2.65 2.22 
Interest rate 1.07 0.60 1.46 0.89 1.39 0.75 
Notes:Crisis periods are defined  as November 1997 to April 1998 for Korea, and July 1997 to April 
1998 for Thailand and Philippines. Pre-crisis and post-crisis are defined as before and after the crisis 
period for each country 
Source: Osawa (2006) 
 
Besides moving to the more flexible exchange rate regimes, these Asian countries 
also alter their monetary policy and adopt the inflation targeting regime after the 
financial crisis of 1997. Korea was the first country in East Asian that has adopted the 
inflation targeting regime, i.e in April 1998. Thailand followed the step in May 2000 
and later Philippines in January 2002 (Osawa, 2006). For more detail on the monetary 
policy framework in these countries, see Table I(1).  
 
 
3 Data 
 
This study focuses on the three crisis-hit Asian countries that have moved from the 
rigid exchange rate regime to the flexible one and inflation targeting regime after the 
crisis namely Korea, Philippines and Thailand. These countries have adopted the 
inflation targeting regime at different time. i.e Korea in April 1998, Thailand in May 
2000 and Philippines in January 2002. For the purpose of this study, the data is 
divided into two sub-periods referring to the starting year of the adoption of the 
inflation targeting regime. The full sample series are from 1990M1 to 2007M5. Period 
I indicates the pre-crisis period or the period before the adoption of inflation targeting. 
It spans from the beginning of 1990 to 1997M61. Period II represents the post-crisis 
period and the starting period of the adoption of inflation targeting regime. The range 
is different across countries. Korea takes the range of 2000M1 to 2007M5, Philippines 
2002M1 to 2007M5 and Thailand 2000M5 to 2007M52.  
 
This study uses two sets of data. The first set of data is used to estimate the system 
equation of SVAR models while the second set of data is used to estimate the GMM 
single equation models. The data are in monthly and are obtained from the 
International Financial Statistics (IFS), IMF. The first set of data consists of money 
demand or M1 (M), bilateral nominal national local currency per USD exchange rate 
(EX), consumer price index (CPI), industrial/ manufacturing production index (IP), 
                                                 
1
 The data for pre-crisis period used in SVAR analysis  is mentioned in Table I(4), Appendix I. The 
data for the pre-crisis period used in GMM analysis spans from 1990M5 to 1997M6. 
2
 Korea officially adopted the headline CPI inflation targeting regime in April 1998 and later switched 
to core CPI in January 2000 (Osawa, 2006).  
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the oil price of the world (OIL), money market rate or short-term interest rate (I) and 
Federal Fund rate (FFR). All the series are in logarithm form except the interest rate. 
The construction of the data and the representation of the variables are explained in 
appendix I,Table I(2a). All the data are tested with unit-root tests and are transformed 
to the stationary data before conducting the estimations (see Table I(3), Appendix I). 
 
The second set of the data consist of short term interest rate (I), output gap (GAP), 
annually inflation rate (PI) and the growth rate of exchange rate (see Table I(2b) in 
Appendix I) . The output gap is defined as the deviation of log industrial production 
index from its HP filtered trend series. The annual rate of inflation is constructed as 
the log current CPI deviates from the log 12th lagged of CPI. The change in exchange 
rate is constructed as the log differenced of exchange rate series from its one lagged 
term.  
 
The single equation approach of GMM is applied using the second data set and 
periods as defined above. However, due to the data availability problem and the 
structure of system equation, the estimation of SVAR model may take a slightly 
different time paths defined above (refer Table I(4), Appendix I). 
 
 
4 Methodology  
 
This study applies two different approaches namely structural VAR and single 
equation based on Generalized Methods of Moment (GMM). Using the structural 
VAR approach, this paper seeks to investigate the effects of exchange rate shocks to 
monetary policy. In the second part, a single equation based on GMM is used to 
estimate the responses of policy reaction function to exchange rate movements.  
 
 
4.1 SVAR 
 
This study takes the ideas and modifies the structural VAR model that identifies the 
exogenous policy shocks and policy reaction functions as in Kim (2003) and Kim & 
Roubini (2000). Following Kim (2003) and Kim & Roubini (2000), the economy can 
be described as: 
( ) t tG L y e=          (1) 
 
G(L) represents a matrix in the lag operator L, ty is the (n x 1) vector and te is an n x 
1 disturbance vector with var( te )= Λ  and Λ is a diagonal matrix. The general reduced 
form of VAR equation takes the form of: 
1( )t t ty B L y u−= +         (2) 
where B(L) is a matrix of lag operator and var( )tu = Σ .  
 
As discussed in Kim (2003), there are different ways to recover the parameters in the 
structural form equation from the reduced form equation. One of the methods is the 
so-called generalized method. This method put restrictions on the contemporaneous 
structural parameters and allows non-recursive structures.  
1 0
0( ) ( )B L G G L−= −         (3) 
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where 0 ( )G L is the coefficient matrix without the contemporaneous coefficient 0G . 
Given that 1 10 0G G
− −Σ = Λ  and Σ contains n(n+1)/2 parameters, we need at least n(n-1)/2 
restrictions on 0G (for further detailed explanations, see Kim (2003)). 
 
In this study, seven variables are included in the VAR model. These variables are 
interest rate (I), monetary aggregate or M1 (M), consumer price index (CPI), output 
(IP), world price of oil in terms of the US Dollar (OIL), Federal funds Rate of the US 
(FFR) and the exchange rate as units of US Dollar (EX). Therefore, the vector of 
stationary endogenous variables can be written as3: 
[ ] 't t t t t t t ty I M CPI IP OIL FFR EX=  
 
The first four variables are the variables used in the standard international 
macroeconomics model or monetary business cycle model. Following Kim & Roubini 
(2000), FFR and OIL have the function of isolating ‘exogenous’ monetary changes. 
As discussed in Kim & Roubini (2000), the recession and price inflation in the 
economy can be due to the monetary contraction and original supply shocks. 
Therefore, in order to identify the shock due to the monetary policy alone, the oil 
price index is used as a proxy for inflationary supply shocks. FFR is used to control 
for the component of domestic monetary policy that react to the foreign monetary 
policy shocks. Finally, nominal exchange rate is used as to investigate the reaction of 
monetary policy to the exchange rate shocks in the small open economies.  
 
As in Kim & Roubini (2000), the restrictions on the contemporaneous structural 
parameters can be written as follows4: 
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where G represents the values of non-restrictions; zero restrictions are assigned on the 
contemporaneous structural parameters. The structural disturbances (left hand side) 
represent the shocks of interest rate, money aggregate, consumer price index, output, 
oil price, foreign monetary policy and exchange rate respectively. The ‘u’ terms in the 
right hand side are the residuals in the reduced form which can be interpreted as 
unexpected movements of variables in the system equation. 
 
Apart from the original restriction used by Kim & Roubini (2000) that apply to the G-
7 countries, this study modifies the restriction on the monetary policy reaction 
function. In this study, the monetary policy reaction function is assumed to follow the 
Taylor rule type equation i.e the interest rate reacts to CPI (price level), IP (output) 
                                                 
3
 All the series are transformed to the stationary series after the first/ second differenced operations.  
4
 In this study, I only consider the stationary variables, however as discussed in Breitung et. al (2004), 
the SVAR modeling can use the variables fitted to the levels ignoring the unit-root and cointegration 
resctrictions to avoid imposing too many restrictions. 
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and EX (exchange rate). As in Kim & Roubini (2000), the exchange rate and the oil 
price variables are included in the monetary reaction function in order to control the 
current responses of monetary policy to the state of the economy.   
 
Apart from this, the second reason to include the exchange rate terms in the policy 
reaction function is to capture the reaction of interest rate (monetary policy) to this 
variable over time in the small open economies environment. In order to investigate 
how significant the role of exchange rate in the monetary policy, I first allow the 
interest rate policy reacts to the exchange rate (model I) and later restrict the reaction 
to zero (model II), i.e B(1,7)=0.  
 
 The other six equations follow the restriction or identification as in Kim & Roubini 
(2000). The second equation is the money demand function that depends on the real 
income (CPI and IP) and the opportunity cost of holding money (nominal interest 
rate). The third equation is the CPI inflation equation that assumed to respond to the 
output and inflationary pressure of the world’s oil price. The output is a function of 
inflationary pressure of oil price variable. Following Kim & Roubini (2000), the oil 
price is assumed to affect prices and the real sector contemporaneously. The foreign 
monetary policy reacts to the oil inflationary pressure shocks. The exchange rate 
equation represents the financial market equilibrium and receives the 
contemporaneous effects of all variables in this model. 
 
As explained in Kim& Roubini (2000), the first two equations represent the money 
market equilibrium, the third and forth equations describe the domestic goods market 
equilibrium, the fifth and sixth equations as exogenous shocks from the foreign 
countries and the last equation describes the exchange rate market.  
 
 
4.2 Generalized Methods of Moment – Monetary policy reaction function 
 
In the second approach, this study applies Generalized Methods of Moment models in 
estimating the monetary policy reaction function. Following Mohanty and Klau 
(2005) and Osawa (2006), the monetary policy reaction function takes the form of: 
 0 1 2 3 4 1 5 1t t t t t ti GAP E E iα α pi α α α α− −= + + + ∆ + ∆ +    (4) 
 0 1 2 5 1t t t ti GAP iα α pi α α −= + + +      (5) 
 
where i is the interest rate policy reaction function; pi  is the inflation rate target 
andGAP  is the output gap target; E is the log exchange rate target and ∆  denotes the 
first differenced operator. The lag term of interest rate acts as the smoothing term. As 
discussed in Osawa (2006), 1α >1 indicates that the central bank attempts to stabilize 
the inflation. If 1α <1, the increase in nominal interest rate may is lower than the real 
interest rate to fully offset the increase in the inflation shocks. According to Mohanty 
and Klau (2004), 3α >0 and 4α ><0. 4α  can be positive or negative because the 
exchange rate is assumed to be mean reverting5.  
                                                 
5
 The conditions hold based on the bilateral nominal exchange rate of USD against domestic currency. 
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Equation (4) is the policy reaction function which reacts to exchange rate movements 
but equation (5) does not. Both policy reaction functions are estimated separately 
using the data of two sub-periods for the three inflation targeting Asian countries6.  
 
 
5 Results 
 
5.1 Results - SVAR 
 
The results of SVAR are based on the contemporaneous coefficients in the SVAR 
models, the impulse response functions and the forecast error variance 
decompositions. The results give us the effects of disturbances or economic shocks on 
the variables in the system and the reactions of variables to shocks.  
 
Based on the same model specifications, estimating the SVAR models that include 
and exclude the exchange rate term do not give very different results except the case 
of period I in Korea and period II in Thailand. In the case of Korea in period I, 
excluding the exchange rate term in the SVAR model gives more reasonable results of 
impulse response functions. Conversely, in the case of period II in Thailand, 
excluding the exchange rate term in the model does not give the right reaction of CPI 
in response to the monetary policy shocks as predicted by theories. The results 
suggest that the policy reaction function in Korea before the crisis may not react 
significantly to exchange rate term. On the other hand, the policy reaction in Thailand 
after the crisis may react to exchange rate. For the other cases where no very different 
results with and without exchange rate in the model, the results suggest that the 
exchange rate term does not have significant effects on the policy reaction functions 
or the policy reaction functions may not react significantly or strongly to the exchange 
rate term.  
 
The following discussions are based on the results of the coefficients of SVAR, 
impulse response functions and forecast error variance decompositions. As discussed 
above, the results of including and excluding the exchange rate term in the model do 
not change very much, this paper only displays the results that include the exchange 
rate term (model I) with the exception of Korea in period I.  
 
The results of SVAR are checked with diagnostic tests, i.e the tests for 
autocorrelation, conditional heteroskedasticity and non-normality (see Table I(4), 
Appendix I).  In most cases, the tests are not able to reject the hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation, no heteroskedasticity and non-normality at 5% significant level. The 
presence of non-normality may due to the unavoidable very short series of data used 
in the analysis.  
 
Table (ii) below summarizes the results of estimated coefficients. Consistent to the 
results reported in Kim & Roubini (2000), the estimated values of G13, G14, G15 and 
G17 are negative in most cases, implying a contractionary policy in response to the 
inflationary pressures. The coefficient for G13 is larger relative to the other 
coefficients, implying that the central banks in these countries are concerned about the 
inflation or price stability. On the other hand, the estimated coefficient of G17 is 
relatively smaller (with the exception of Thailand), implying that the reaction of 
                                                 
6
 The instrument variables include the constant and one to four lags on all the endogenous variables. 
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policy reaction function to exchange rate is relatively small. In Thailand, the policy 
reaction function is strongly impacted by the exchange rate shocks. In all cases, the 
likelihood ratio test show that the identifying restrictions are not significant at the 
significant level.  
 
Table (ii):  
Estimated coefficients for SVAR 
 Period I Period II 
 Korea Philippines Thailand Korea Philippines Thailand 
G13 
 
G14 
 
G15 
 
G17 
 
G21 
 
G23 
 
G24 
 
G34 
 
G35 
 
G45 
 
G65 
 
G71 
 
G72 
 
G73 
 
G74 
 
G75 
 
G76 
 
-64.0135 
(71.3225) 
2.0925 
(5.6228) 
5.9585 
(2.7856) 
- 
- 
0.0036 
(0.0006) 
0.3964 
(0.3474) 
0.0513 
(0.0287) 
-0.0088 
(0.0093) 
-0.0117 
(0.0044) 
-0.0119 
(0.0564) 
-0.0044 
(0.2504) 
-0.0013 
(0.0008) 
-0.3139 
(0.1348) 
0.3374 
(0.4191) 
-0.0581 
(0.0333) 
-0.0338 
(0.0167) 
0.0048 
(0.0073) 
-46.8214 
(99.9663) 
-25.5912 
(13.0309) 
-6.0239 
(7.5734) 
-11.6141 
(111.4808) 
0.0011 
(0.0006) 
-0.8687 
(0.3682) 
0.0320 
(0.0456) 
0.0234 
(0.0120) 
0.0125 
(0.0083) 
0.0990 
(0.0700) 
-0.3686 
(0.2068) 
0.0011 
(0.0019) 
-0.2184 
(0.1051) 
-0.2097 
(0.3978) 
0.0218 
(0.0653) 
-0.0125 
(0.0331) 
0.0333 
(0.0149) 
-12.3383 
(74.7000) 
20.8797 
(10.3171) 
-9.9200 
(5.8617) 
-88.4873 
(250.5432) 
0.0013 
(0.0013) 
-0.0110 
(0.7671) 
0.0824- 
(0.1128) 
-0.0054 
(0.6150) 
0.0058 
(0.0058) 
0.0121 
(0.0409) 
-0.4211 
(0.2355) 
0.0013 
(0.0011) 
0.0080 
(0.0194) 
0.1214 
(0.1382) 
0.0443 
(0.0307) 
0.0106 
(0.0115) 
-0.0074 
(0.0034) 
0.2126 
(4.7981) 
-0.6398 
(0.3479) 
-0.0474 
(0.1257) 
-0.7507 
(2.5363) 
0.0157 
(0.0127) 
0.4068 
(0.3303) 
-0.0624 
(0.0310) 
-0.0096 
(0.0093) 
-0.0134 
(0.0033) 
0.0464 
(0.0389) 
-0.2884 
(0.1985) 
0.0488 
(0.1646) 
0.2973 
(0.3074) 
1.3063 
(0.9938) 
0.0057 
(0.1323) 
0.0100 
(0.0325) 
-0.0256 
(0.0161) 
-38.0754 
(14.1206) 
-0.0754 
(0.9993) 
0.6095 
(0.7694) 
-4.8488 
(13.8029) 
-0.0004 
(0.0057) 
0.5259 
(0.6445) 
0.0618 
(0.0403) 
0.0034 
(0.0079) 
-0.0056 
(0.0043) 
0.1310 
(0.0620) 
-0.0027 
(0.2047) 
0.0229 
(0.0229) 
-0.0080 
(0.1109) 
-0.9679 
(1.0487) 
-0.0286 
(0.0388) 
-0.0320 
(0.227 
(0.0117) 
-55.6241 
(76.5138) 
-7.5323 
(12.6054) 
-2.7306 
(3.1083) 
-72.2476 
(99.5841) 
-0.1132 
(0.0453) 
0.3906 
(0.8887) 
-0.3442 
(0.1299) 
-0.0050 
(0.0176) 
-0.0137 
(0.0055) 
0.0034 
(0.0361) 
-0.1813 
(0.1912) 
1.0929 
(2.2988) 
5.4647 
(11.5603) 
-6.0908 
(15.2043) 
-0.2246 
(1.1748) 
-1.2572 
(2.7098) 
-0.3830 
(0.8119) 
LR test 
χ 2 
probability 
 
9.1301 
0.1040 
 
 
3.6474 
0.4558 
 
1.3820 
0.8473 
 
2.4459 
0.6544 
 
4.3851 
0.3564 
 
1.5489 
0.8179 
Note: 
The number of over-identified variables is 4 in all cases but 5 in the case of Thailand in period I. The 
values in parentheses are the standard errors 
 
The results of the impulse response functions (IRF) for model I are summarized in 
Appendix II. The middle line represents the responses while the upper and lower 
dashed lines are two standard error bands. In general, the reactions of the domestic 
variables to a one percent monetary policy shock are consistent as predicted by the 
economic theory. The monetary policy interest rate shock leads to the increase in 
interest rate, but the decline in M1, CPI and appreciation in the exchange rate.  
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Apart from the effects of monetary policy shock, the reactions of monetary policy 
interest rate to domestic shocks are also observed and summarized in Table II(3, 
Appendix II). The increase in CPI (demand shock) and output growth (supply shock) 
as well as the depreciation in the exchange rate (exchange rate shock) lead to the 
increase in the interest rate. In the case of period II in Korea, the increase in the 
interest rate is followed by its decline afterwards. In Thailand, the increase in output 
growth does not followed by the tightened in interest rate.   
 
Table (iii) below reports the results of numerical values of impulse response functions 
of monetary policy interest rate to the inflation, output growth and exchange rate 
shocks. In general, the magnitude of the change in the policy reaction in response to 
the domestic shocks (CPI, output and exchange rate) has declined after the financial 
crisis of 1997. These results do not necessary mean that the policy reaction functions 
in these countries do not react to these three shocks but it could be due to the declined 
on the effects of the shocks or lower persistency of shocks in period II (after the 
recovering from the crisis). 
 
Table (iii):  
Impulse response functions: effects of shocks on monetary policy 
Korea Philippines Thailand Shocks Periods 
I II I II I II 
CPI 1 
4 
8 
12 
16 
20 
0.0637 
0.1015 
0.1678 
0.1659 
0.1794 
0.2039 
0.0077 
-0.0223 
-0.0327 
-0.0287 
-0.0234 
-0.0212 
0.1339 
0.3135 
0.1513 
0.1725 
0.3234 
0.4814 
0.0687 
0.1111 
0.1498 
0.1649 
0.1712 
0.1750 
0.0040 
0.0358 
0.0226 
0.0308 
0.0281 
0.0280 
0.0260 
0.0627 
0.1330 
0.1574 
0.1608 
0.1597 
Output gap 1 
4 
8 
12 
16 
20 
0.1677 
0.0676 
0.1820 
0.1310 
0.2214 
0.3018 
0.0169 
0.0185 
0.0027 
-0.0066 
-0.0102 
-0.0099 
0.7828 
0.9805 
0.3632 
0.4399 
0.7381 
0.5474 
0.0016 
0.0207 
0.0233 
0.0265 
0.0284 
0.0288 
-0.4633 
-0.3983 
-0.3727 
-0.3391 
-0.3225 
-0.3117 
-0.0001 
-0.0217 
-0.0486 
-0.0583 
-0.0458 
-0.0515 
Exchange rate 1 
4 
8 
12 
16 
20 
0.0000 
0.0855 
0.3608 
0.4519 
0.5294 
0.5972 
0.0221 
0.0046 
-0.0053 
-0.0171 
-0.0141 
-0.0140 
-0.6454 
-0.8560 
-1.0736 
-0.7889 
-1.0492 
-0.9833 
0.0371 
0.8327 
0.0940 
0.0911 
0.0889 
0.0874 
0.3183 
0.3581 
0.3560 
0.3503 
0.3433 
0.3404 
0.0613 
0.0981 
0.1164 
0.1177 
0.1225 
0.1266 
 
Table (iv):  
FEVD: Maximum effects of shocks on monetary policy 
Shocks Korea Philippines Thailand 
 I II I II I II 
I 0.94 0.86 0.94 0.85 0.84 0.04 
M 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.30 
CPI 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.17 
IP 0.06 0.11 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.08 
OIL 0.11 0.07 0.02 0.13 0.07 0.28 
FFR 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.06 
EX 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.04  0.03 0.43   
Notes:  
The maximum effects of shocks (in percentage) are obtained from FEVD generated by 
running the SVAR models.   
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Although the effects of these three shocks have declined over time, the results of the 
forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) show that the maximum explanatory 
power of CPI or inflation shock on the forecast errors variance of the policy reaction 
function in these three Asian countries has increased after the adoption of inflation 
targeting (see Table (iv)). This implies greater concerns from the authorities on price 
stability. On the other hand, the maximum determination power of exchange rate on 
policy reaction function remains low in Korea and Philippines but increases sharply in 
Thailand from at most 3% to at most 43% or at a mode of 24% in period II. Thailand 
adopted the fixed exchange rate before the financial crisis of 1997-98 but has 
switched to the floating regime and inflation targeting after the financial crisis. The 
switch from the fixed regime to the flexible one means exchange rate is allowed to 
fluctuate freely which generates higher volatility in the exchange rate movement or 
greater exchange rate shocks.  
 
 
5.2 Results – GMM 
 
Using the Generalized Methods of Moment approach, equation (4) and (5) are 
estimated for the two sub-periods. The instruments variables consist of one to four 
lags of output gap, inflation, interest rate and nominal exchange rate7. Therefore, the 
number of overidentifying restrictions for equation (4) and equation (5) are 12 and 14 
respectively. The chi-square of overidenfying restrictions at 5% significant level are 
21.0 and 23.7 respectively. In all cases, the sizes of sample (adjusted for the degree of 
freedom) multiply with J values are smaller than the values of chi-square, i.e the 
overidentifying restrictions cannot reject at the 5% significant level. The results are 
summarized in Table (v) and (iv) below. The results of GMM give us the ideas on 
how the policy functions react to the economic variables over time. As in the SVAR 
approach, excluding the exchange rate term in the policy reaction function does not 
change much the results. On the other hand, the policy reaction functions in all the 
three countries react significantly to the interest rate smoothing term.  
 
Table (iv) summarizes the results of policy reaction coefficients. It is observed that 
Thailand is the only country where the monetary policy reacts to exchange rate (EX) 
in the pre- and post-crisis periods. Thailand is also the only country that follows the 
Taylor Principle, i.e the long-run coefficient for the policy responds to 
inflation ( )1 5/1 1α α− > . The central bank in Thailand raises the real interest rate 
higher than the nominal interest rate in response to the increase in inflation rate. The 
policy reaction functions in other two countries namely Korea and Philippines do not 
react significantly to the exchange rate (EX).  
 
Comparing the results before and after the crisis, it is observed that the policy reaction 
equation of (4) and (5) fit the data very well in the post-crisis period or after the 
implementation of inflation targeting regime where short-term interest rate is used as 
the policy instrument. Before the implementation of inflation targeting regime, the 
equations fit badly the data in Philippines. The results also show that the policy 
makers react differently to inflation. The policy makers in Korea and Thailand are 
concerned about the inflation or price stability. Philippines although has implemented 
                                                 
7
 In Philippines, the nominal bilateral exchange rate and the nominal effective exchange rate of lag one 
and two are included as instrument variables in addition to the instrument variables as in Korea and 
Thailand. 
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the inflation targeting regime, the policy reaction function in Philippines does not 
react significantly to inflation but reacts strongly to the output gap in period II. In 
Korea, the policy reaction function reacts significantly to inflation in both sub-
periods. However, the coefficient of inflation in the policy reaction function is very 
small and closed to zero in period II. The same results also reported in Osawa (2006). 
According to Osawa (2006), the low response of BOK to inflation does not 
necessarily imply the failure of the inflation targeting regime in Korea but it can be 
interpreted as the achievement of low inflation in Korea induced by the inflation 
targeting regime. Hence there is low response of monetary policy to inflation in Korea 
in period II. This condition can be observed from the line graph. 
 
Figure (i) show the line graphs of short-term interest rate and annually inflation rate 
for these three countries. As observed in Korea, the inflation rate is lower and more 
stable in period II. The interest rate in period II is constant in responds to lower 
inflation environment. In Thailand, there is a co-movement of inflation and interest 
rate and inflation rate gains stability after the implementation of inflation targeting 
regime. In Philippines, the interest rate does not react accordingly to control the 
fluctuations in inflation rate. There is no significant improvement in the inflation rate.  
 
Figure (i): Interest rate and inflation rate (1990M5-2007M5) 
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Table (vi) shows the estimated results of policy reaction functions that exclude the 
exchange rate terms. Excluding the exchange rate terms in the policy reaction 
function does not affect the policy reactions to other variables in the equation in all 
cases. Excluding the exchange rate term (EX) in the policy reaction function even 
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generates higher R-square and lower standard error in Korea and Philippines. On the 
other hand, since the monetary policy in Thailand reacts to exchange rate term (EX) 
strongly in period I, excluding the exchange rate term in the policy reaction function 
gives lower R-square and higher standard error in period I. However, excluding the 
exchange rate term in period II in Thailand generates better fit of data. In general, the 
results of GMM are consistent to the results of SVAR, i.e the policy reaction 
functions in Korea and Philippines do not react significantly to exchange rate directly 
in both sub-periods and there is a strong response of policy reaction function in 
Thailand to exchange rate movements in the pre-crisis period.   
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Table (v):  
Estimated of simple rule with exchange rate terms 
Countries Period Pie Gap I(-1) de de(-1) Std. 
error 
J-stat R2 
Korea I 
II 
0.2035*** 
-0.0247*** 
0.0547 
0.0049* 
0.6268*** 
0.9941*** 
0.2465 
-0.0056 
-0.0182 
0.0017 
0.0122 
0.0009 
0.0885 
0.0615 
0.7174 
0.9778 
Philippines I 
II 
0.1618* 
-0.0063 
-0893 
0.0267*** 
0.3644*** 
0.5198*** 
0.0354 
-0.0507 
-0.1078 
-0.0167 
0.0467 
0.0027 
0.0946 
0.1201 
0.0076 
0.5700 
Thailand I 
II 
0.2460 
0.0745*** 
0.0121 
-0.0001 
0.7924 
0.9474 
-1.5285*** 
-0.0567*** 
0.7733** 
0.0188 
0.0206 
0.0021 
0.1021 
0.0864 
0.6233 
0.9721 
Notes:  
*** denotes the significant level at 1% interval 
** denotes the significant level at 5% interval 
* denotes the significant level at 10% interval 
Chi-square (12)=21.0 
 
 
Table (vi):  
Simple rule without exchange rate terms 
Countries Period Pie Gap I(-1) S.E J-stat R2 
Korea Period I 
Period II 
0.2045*** 
-0.0246*** 
0.0551 
0.0040 
0.6641*** 
0.9962*** 
0.0121 
0.0009 
0.0898 
0.0618 
0.7148 
0.9781 
Philippines Period I 
Period II 
0.1847** 
0.0023 
0.1111 
0.0231*** 
0.3384*** 
0.6040*** 
0.0454 
0.0026 
0.0935 
0.1374 
0.0376 
0.6000 
Thailand Period I 
Period II 
0.4453** 
0.0717*** 
-0.0450 
-0.0057 
0.6925*** 
0.9520*** 
0.0218 
0.0017 
0.1338 
0.1419 
0.5654 
0.9813 
 Notes: as mentioned under the footnotes in table (iv); Chi-square(14)=23.7 
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6 Conclusions 
 
Economists and researchers have different opinions on the role of exchange rate in the 
design of monetary policy in emerging market. The move from rigidity to flexible 
exchange rate regime and inflation targeting induce more debates on the relationship 
between monetary policy and exchange rate. Researchers have different explanation 
on the decline of the degree of pass-through and the lower relationship between the 
monetary policy and exchange rate variables under the inflation targeting 
environment. While some researchers explain this as the contribution of the positive 
effects of inflation targeting, others refer this as the result of foreign exchange 
intervention. They argue that the lower correlation between monetary policy and 
exchange rate variables does not mean that there is no role for exchange rate in the 
design of policy rule but this may due to the intervention activity. 
 
Applying a structural VAR and GMM approaches, this study seeks to find out the 
answer on the relationship of monetary policy and exchange rate in three East Asian 
countries that have moved to the inflation targeting regime after the financial crisis of 
1997-98. In particular, this study seeks to compare the result before and after the 
change to a more flexible exchange rate regime and the adoption of inflation targeting 
regime. Applying the SVAR approach to investigate the response of policy reaction 
function to exchange rate shock, the results of impulse response functions show that 
the responses of interest rate to domestic variables shocks (as well as exchange rate 
shock) have declined.  Although the price level is less volatile and more stable (as 
well as other variables), the relative explanatory power of CPI shock on monetary 
policy has increased after the adoption of inflation targeting regime. The explanatory 
power of exchange rate shock on the other hand, remains low in two out of three 
countries in this study.  
 
Consistent to the results reported in SVAR models, the results of GMM show that the 
policy reaction function of two East Asian countries react weakly to the exchange rate 
movements. In both approaches, excluding the exchange rate term in the policy 
reaction function does not generate large changes in the policy reaction function. This 
is because the policy function does not show a significant response to the exchange 
rate movement directly. However, this does not mean that the exchange rate does not 
play a role in the monetary policy in these countries. The exchange rate may influence 
the movements of policy reaction function indirectly through its effects on the 
domestic variables such as inflation and output gap. On the other hand, the central 
bank may react to the exchange rate movements through intervention in the foreign 
exchange market as argued in many studies (for example Osawa (2006), Disyatat & 
Galati (2005)). The questions of whether the authorities of these countries react to 
exchange rate through the intervention in the foreign exchange market and that 
including the exchange rate terms directly in the policy reaction function is welfare 
improving for the inflation targeting small open economy remains for future research.  
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APPENDIX I 
 
Table I(1) 
Monetary Policy Framework 
No Countries Monetary Policy Framework 
1 Korea Three main periods: 
1. Monetary targeting 
Since 1957, M1 was pre-announced quarterly or yearly as a macroeconomics 
policy 
In 1979, monetary target changed to a M2 growth rate till mid 1990s 
After crisis 1997-98, accepted IMF rescue financing plan, used M3 as reference 
value of monetary base, at the same time, adopted inflation targeting (two pillar 
system) 
In 2001, monitored M3 growth and the monitoring ended in 2003 with a pure 
inflation targeting 
2. Interest rate as an operational target 
After 1997-98, the interest rate was accepted as an operational target. 
Since 1999, Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) announced the target call rate for 
interest rate. 
3. Inflation targeting 
Since 2000, core CPI inflation rate has been chosen as the benchmark inflation 
indicator. 
The target rate is determined annually with the range of +/-1%. 
Official exchange rate regimes: 
1. March 1980-October 1997----Managed floating 
2. November 1997-present----Independently floating 
 
2 Philippines Two periods: 
1. Monetary targeting 
In the past, monetary policy framework based on base or reserve money 
programming. 
2. Inflation targeting (2002 onwards) 
Inflation targeting policy adopted officially in January 2000 and the 
implementation started in January 2002. 
CPI or headline inflation is used as its monetary policy target and overnight 
repurchase rate and reverse repurchase rate are used as the main instrument of 
monetary policy. 
Official exchange rate regimes: 
1. January 1988-present----Independently floating 
 
3 Thailand Three main periods: 
1. Pegged exchange rate regime (2nd World War-June 1997) 
      The value of Baht was pegged to a major currency/ gold or to a basket of currencies 
2. Monetary targeting regime (July 1997-May 2000) 
Beginning the periods of floating exchange rate.  
Received assistance from IMF, targeted at domestic money supply. 
Set daily and quarterly monetary base targets. 
3. Inflation targeting regime (May 2000-present) 
Inflation targeting is more effective as the relationship between money supply and 
output growth was becoming less stable after financial crisis. 
Official exchange rate regimes: 
1. January 1970-June 1997-----fixed 
2. July 1997-present----Independently floating 
 
Sources: Hernandez & Montiel (2001), IMF & BIS 
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Table I(2a): 
List of Series, Definitions and Data sources for SVAR 
No. Variables Data Sources 
1 Logarithms of Nominal 
exchange rate (EX) 
a) Korea 
b) Philippines 
c) Thailand 
Logarithms of Bilateral exchange 
rate of national currency per US 
Dollar. 
 
International 
Financial Statistics 
(IFS), IMF 
2 Level of interest rate (I) 
a) Korea 
b) Philippines 
c) Thailand 
Money market rate International 
Financial Statistics 
(IFS), IMF 
3 Logarithms of Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) 
a) Korea 
b) Philippines 
c) Thailand 
Logarithms of Consumer Price Index  International 
Financial Statistics 
(IFS), IMF 
 
 
4 Logarithms of money demand 
(M) 
a) Korea 
b) Philippines 
c) Thailand 
Logarithms of M1  International 
Financial Statistics 
(IFS), IMF and 
OECD dataset 
 
 
5 Output (IP) 
a) Korea 
b) Philippines 
c) Thailand 
Logarithms of industrial production 
index; Thailand uses logarithms in 
GDP  
International 
Financial Statistics 
(IFS), IMF and 
BOT 
6 Federal Fund Rate (FFR) Level of U.S Federal Fund Rate International 
Financial Statistics 
(IFS), IMF 
7 The oil price of the world 
(OIL) 
Logarithms of world’s oil price in 
USD 
International 
Financial Statistics 
(IFS), IMF 
  
 
Table I(2b): 
List of Series, Definitions and Data sources for GMM 
No. Variables Definitions Sources 
1 Interest rate Money market rate International Financial 
Statistics (IFS), IMF 
2 Inflation (annual) [ ]12 12( ) /t t tcpi cpi cpi− −−  International Financial Statistics (IFS), IMF 
3 Output gap Log differenced of industrial 
production index from its HP filter 
trend series 
International Financial 
Statistics (IFS), IMF 
4 Growth in 
exchange rate 
Log differenced of exchange rate 
from its first lagged term 
 
International Financial 
Statistics (IFS), IMF 
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Table I(3): 
Unit-root Test for Stationarity 
Countries Variables Period I Period II 
  ADF SP ADF SP 
cpi -3.3311* -1.4531 -2.8168 -3.3256*** 
dcpi -6.2544*** -6.3056*** -7.6000*** -7.1676*** 
ex -1.4323 -1.0312 -2.7569 -1.4241 
dex -3.7609*** -5.8706*** -4.5170*** -7.5151*** 
ip -5.1666*** -5.8275*** -5.6817*** -7.6071*** 
dip -10.0004*** -9.9964*** -8.8114*** -13.0901*** 
i -3.3909* -3.0344** -1.2414 -1.4410 
di -6.0716*** -8.9032*** -3.7599*** -5.4840*** 
m -1.5036 -1.0335 -0.3119 -1.6578 
Korea 
dm -5.9502*** -6.9428*** -2.7503* -3.7149*** 
cpi -2.6873 -1.5936 -1.5210 -1.3460 
dcpi -4.5714*** -4.8487*** -4.9629*** -6.5703*** 
ex -3.3279* -1.7709 -1.6341 -1.3213 
dex -5.0201*** -9.7624*** -3.8535*** -9.8971*** 
ip -2.8921 -5.7595*** -3.1840* -4.5800*** 
dip -8.5704*** -10.9489*** -6.3263*** -10.5865*** 
i -4.6807*** -6.8402*** -2.2392 -2.0671 
di -8.5805*** -11.5418*** -5.3103*** -5.9204*** 
m -3.9118** 4.6786*** -1.5513 -2.3199 
Philippines 
dm -7.8396*** -9.8818*** -6.7730*** -3.1082** 
cpi -1.9359 -2.2179 -1.4798 -1.5117 
dcpi -5.8941*** -6.5645*** -4.5008*** -6.8421*** 
ex -2.1144 -2.3002 -3.2142* -1.5767 
dex -4.5419*** -7.1378*** -4.0105*** -8.2006*** 
ip -4.2741*** -5.2168*** -3.1506* -8.6148*** 
dip -6.6303*** -14.2456*** -8.5779*** -12.3351*** 
i -2.5067 -3.2967** -3.1270 -2.4393 
di -6.7255*** -8.4554*** -4.6891*** -5.0977*** 
m -3.6285** -2.1545 -0.9260 -1.8921 
Thailand 
dm -5.0753*** -4.7797*** -4.7022*** -3.4082** 
ffr -1.9534 -0.8631 -1.6172 -1.0438 
dffr -2.4857 -5.7729*** -2.2359 -2.7507 
ddffr -6.8503*** -14.1540*** -7.2317*** 8.6900*** 
oil -3.6711** -3.2326** -2.1468 -1.9390 
U.S 
doil -5.3089*** -6.0117*** -5.9282*** -8.8306*** 
Notes: 
*** denotes the significant statistic at 1% level 
** denotes the significant statistic at 5% level 
* denotes the significant statistic at 10% level 
“d” denotes the first differenced on the original series 
All the variables are in logarithm form except “ ffr and i 
ADF denotes Augmented Dicky FullerTest and SP denotes Schmidt PhillipsTest; the 
specifications for ADF consist of 2 lags, constant and trend for all level of variables and 
constant and 2 lags for differenced variables. 
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Table I(4) 
Model Specifications and Diagnostic Test for SVAR 
Test Korea Philippines Thailand 
 Period I Period II Period I Period II Period I Period II 
Test for 
 Autocorrelation 
Portmanteau Test 
 
 
671.1281 
(0.6198) 
 
 
691.4877 
(0.6447) 
 
 
855.0112 
(0.2663) 
 
 
726.9652 
(0.4516) 
 
 
845.7450 
(0.4765) 
 
 
687.5960 
(0.2882) 
Test for Non-
normality 
Doornik & Hansen: 
Joint t-stat 
 
Skewness only 
 
Kurtosis only 
 
 
 
15.8140 
(0.3249) 
8.7576 
(0.2705) 
7.0565 
(0.4230) 
 
 
 
17.0212 
(0.2550) 
12.0228 
(0.0998) 
4.9984 
(0.6602) 
 
 
 
28.2335 
(0.0132) 
14.7040 
(0.0400) 
13.5295 
(0.0602) 
 
 
 
50.9652 
(0.0000) 
14.9014 
(0.0377) 
36.0639 
(0.0000) 
 
 
 
19.9706 
(0.1311) 
9.6279 
(0.2107) 
10.3427 
(0.1700) 
 
 
 
9.2254 
(0.8163) 
7.1064 
(0.4179) 
2.1190 
(0.9530) 
Test for Conditional 
Heteroskedasticity 
ARCH-LM Test 
u1 
 
u2 
 
u3 
 
u4 
 
u5 
 
u6 
 
u7 
 
 
 
 
14.6828 
(0.5480) 
8.8440 
(0.9197) 
12.7476 
(0.6911) 
17.7327 
(0.3398) 
15.9075 
(0.4594) 
14.6469 
(0.5506) 
16.7558 
(0.4016) 
 
 
 
10.4000 
(0.8449) 
19.0078 
(0.2683) 
24.4074 
(0.0810) 
7.4283 
(0.9641) 
7.8549 
(0.9531) 
9.6358 
(0.8849) 
7.6755 
(0.9579) 
 
 
 
6.0016 
(0.9881) 
8.9711 
(0.9146) 
15.5181 
(0.4871) 
20.5765 
(0.1954) 
8.2195 
(0.9421) 
10.8995 
(0.8156) 
25.3313 
(0.6242) 
 
 
 
14.0076 
(0.5982) 
8.6384 
(0.9276) 
10.6626 
(0.8298) 
8.5830 
(0.9296) 
9.4193 
(0.8951) 
11.5924 
(0.7715) 
15.3974 
(0.4958) 
 
 
 
9.8723 
(0.8732) 
9.4439 
(0.8940) 
13.6724 
(0.6231) 
10.3828 
(0.8459) 
5.9364 
(0.9888) 
15.9281 
(0.4580) 
10.8397 
(0.8793) 
 
 
 
14.951 
(0.5279) 
16.3431 
(0.4293) 
12.2567 
(0.7259) 
10.2767 
(0.8518) 
15.1230 
(0.5156) 
9.8401 
(0.8748) 
13.5417 
(0.6328) 
Specifications C, S, T, 5 
lags 
C,S,T, 
 4 lags, 
imp01m10, 
Imp05m11 
S,C,T, 3 
lags,  
Imp90m8 
C, S, 3 
lags, 
imp02m11, 
Imp04m6 
C,S, T, 
2 lags, 
imp90m8 
C,S, 5 
lags 
 
 
Samples 1991M1-
1997M4 
2000M1-
2007M5 
1989M6-
1997M6 
2001M6-
2007M2 
1990M1-
1997M6 
2000M5-
2006M12 
 
Notes: 
The upper numbers are the t-statistics and the parentheses values are the p-values. Most of the numbers 
are not significant at 5% level and cannot reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation, normality 
and no conditional heteroskedasticity with the exception of Philippines due to short series. 
C denotes the constant, S is seasonal dummies and T is trend. 
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APPENDIX II 
 
Table II(1) 
IRF:Effects of monetary policy on I, M and CPI 
 Period I Period II 
Korea 
  
Philippines 
  
Thailand 
 
 
Notes: 
The figures show the effects of domestic monetary policy on I, m and CPI from the top to down 
ordering 
M denotes the monetary aggregate, I denotes the interest rate and EX is the exchange rate 
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Table II(2) 
IRF: effects of monetary policy shocks on IP and EX 
 Period I Period II 
Korea 
 
 
Philippines 
 
 
Thailand 
 
 
Notes: 
The figures show the effects of domestic monetary policy on GAP, and EX  from the top to down 
ordering 
IP denotes the output, ex denotes nominal exchange rate 
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Table II(3) 
IRF: the responses of monetary policy to IP, CPI and EX shocks 
 Period I Period II 
Korea 
 
 
Philippines 
 
 
 
Thailand 
  
Notes: 
The figures show the impulses of CPI, IP and EX on monetary policy from the left to right ordering 
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